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Financial Illiteracy and Pension
Contributions: A Field Experiment on
Compound Interest in China
Changcheng Song
Singapore Management University
I conduct a field experiment to study the relationship between peoples’ misunderstanding of
compound interest and their pension contributions in rural China. I find that explaining the
concept of compound interest to subjects increased pension contributions by roughly 40%.
The treatment effect is larger for those who underestimate compound interest than for those
who overestimate compound interest. Moreover, financial education enables households
to partially correct their misunderstanding of compound interest. I structurally estimate
the level of misunderstanding of compound interest and conduct a counterfactual welfare
analysis: lifetime utility increases by about 10% if subjects’ misunderstanding of compound
interest is eliminated. (JEL D03, D14, J26, O16)
Received February 17, 2016; editorial decision December 21, 2018 by Editor Stijn Van
Nieuwerburgh. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the
Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.
The inadequacy of retirement savings in the United States is a common, and
at times controversial, theme in the literature (Venti and Wise 1997; Lusardi
1999; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006).
Two strands of literature seek to explain this phenomenon. One, which focuses
on the lack of information and financial sophistication, stresses the importance
of financial literacy and financial education; the other attributes undersaving to
self-control problems and procrastination.1
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This paper follows the first strand. Financial illiteracy is widespread in the
world and is correlated with poor decision-making, even when the consequences
are as significant as they are for retirement savings and home equity loans
(Agarwal et al. 2009; Gerardi, Goette, and Meier 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell
2014; Agarwal and Mazumder 2013; Goda et al. 2015; Stango, Yoong, and
Zinman 2017). I focus on one concrete definition of financial illiteracy:
misunderstanding compound interest. Understanding compound interest is
especially important to retirement savings decisions due to long investment
horizons. Does such a misunderstanding influence pension contributions? Can
pension contributions be improved by explaining the concept of compound
interest to potential pension contributors?
I designed a field experiment to evaluate whether misunderstanding
compound interest is partially responsible for low pension contributions in
rural China. I randomly assigned more than 1,000 Chinese households to 1
of 3 groups: the Control group, the Calculation group, and the Education
group. In the control group, I visited households, explained the pension
contract, and conducted a survey about their socioeconomic background. In the
calculation treatment, I also calculated respondents’ expected pension benefit
levels after age 60 if they contributed at various levels starting at age 30. In the
education treatment, I asked respondents questions about compound interest,
explained the correct answers, taught them the basic concept of compound
interest, and performed the same calculations used in the calculation treatment.
The education treatment tests whether I can correct individual bias about
compound interest through consumer learning. Comparison of the calculation
treatment and the education treatment tests whether providing information or
improving understanding increases pension contributions. I collaborated with
a local government to provide the interventions before participants chose their
contributions for that year, and then collected administrative data on their actual
pension contributions from the local government.
I find that 56% of rural households in the sample told us they do not know the
answer to the simplest compound interest question (after repeated prompting),
and 73% of those who answered the question underestimated compound
interest. The experiment reveals that the education treatment increased the
contribution for that year by 49–53 RMB, resulting in an increase of 40%
relative to the average contribution of 133 RMB in the control group.
Why does teaching compound interest increase pension contributions? One
possible channel is a better understanding of compound interest, so that subjects
can apply the principle to their own choices. Another is learning the benefits
of a pension in general, which suggests that providing retirement income
projection should have equivalent effects. To distinguish these channels, I study
the heterogeneous effect with respect to initial knowledge about compound
interest, compare the effects between the education group and the calculation
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I find that the treatment effect of the education group is larger for those who
underestimate compound interest than for those who overestimate compound
interest. Moreover, simply performing the calculations and explaining the
benefits increased the contribution by 20–25 RMB, an increase of 15%–19%
relative to the control group. This effect is significantly smaller than the effect of
the education treatment. The treatment effects of the education and calculation
groups are similar for those who are around age 30, but differ as age increases:
the treatment effect of the calculation group is lower than that of the education
group for those who are around ages 40 to 50. In addition, I measured financial
literacy in a post-intervention survey, and found that financial education can
help people improve their understanding of compound interest. These results
suggest that learning the benefits of a pension in general is unlikely to explain
the overall treatment effects. In contrast, explaining compound interest is likely
to increase people’ ability to link the calculation of benefits to their own choices,
and thus increase pension contributions.
I further exploit the experimental variation and structurally estimate a life
cycle model in which subjects underestimate compound interest. I combine
both the survey data and actual pension contributions from the experimental
data to estimate risk aversion parameters, time preferences parameters,
and parameters of underestimating compound interest. Estimates show that
households underestimate compound interest in both the control group and the
education group. The estimated bias in the education group is much smaller
than that in the control group, which is consistent with the reduced form results
that the education treatment helps to reduce the underestimation of compound
interest.
Finally, I use the estimated parameters to simulate the impact of several
counterfactual policies on pension contributions. Simulation results show
that, while both increasing the subsidy and financial education help to
increase pension contributions, financial education about compound interest
is more effective than increasing the existing subsidy by 100%. Based on the
counterfactual simulation, I can calculate the lifetime utility for each individual
and analyze the welfare effect. I show that the education treatment increases the
lifetime utility by 8.6% compared to the control group, and the lifetime utility
increases by 10.0% if the misunderstanding of compound interest is eliminated.
This paper makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the literature
on financial literacy and financial education.2 My main innovation is to
study a concrete definition of financial literacy: understanding compound
interest. I provide financial education on a specific aspect of financial literacy,
and link understanding of compound interest with actual pension savings.
2 The evidence on financial education is mixed. Some studies find no effects or only small effects of financial
education on individual decisions (Duflo and Saez 2003; Carter et al. 2008; Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2011; Cole
et al. 2012), whereas others find positive and significant effects (Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz 2008; Agarwal
et al. 2010; Carlin and Robinson 2012; Gaurav, Cole, and Tobacman 2011; Cai and Song 2017; Seshan and Yang
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In a recent field experiment, Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner (2014) show
that sending retirement-income projections in a printed brochure increases
individual contributions to voluntary retirement plans in the United States. In
particular, the calculation group in this paper is similar to Goda, Manchester,
and Sojourner’s (2014) key interventions, and my results are similar; what
differs is that I connect this response to a concrete aspect of financial literacy. I
add the education group and show that teaching compound interest has a larger
effect than projecting income. I also measure the understanding of compound
interest so that I can identify consumer bias and the mechanisms by which my
interventions can increase individual contributions; this design enables us to
identify individual utility functions and, in turn, generate hypotheses for other
household finance decisions, such as borrowing (Stango and Zinman 2009) and
life cycle consumption (Levy and Tasoff 2016).
Second, I bridge the gap between my theoretical framework and experimental
results by structural estimation of individual preference and welfare analysis
of the financial education provided. Previous research on financial education
focuses on identifying which interventions change financial decisions; few
focus on whether the intervention affects underlying structural parameters
or changes individual decisions toward the decisions implied by economic
models, and thus improves welfare. In this paper, I combine a field experiment
with structural estimation based on a benchmark life cycle model, and test
whether the intervention changes individual decisions toward the decisions
implied by the benchmark model. I exploit the experimental variation and
quantify the treatment effects by estimating the parameters of underestimating
compound interest in both the control group and the education group. The results
are consistent with the reduced form results that the intervention reduces the
misunderstanding of compound interest.
Third, the results contribute to the literature on consumer bias and pension
savings. Prior research suggests that many people do not save enough volun-
tarily to maximize their lifetime utility (Barr and Diamond 2008). Low savings
for retirement can be driven by behavioral factors, such as procrastination
(Choi et al. 2002; Thaler and Benartzi 2004), defaults (Madrian and Shea
2001; Beshears et al. 2008), or how information and choices are framed (Choi
et al. 2012; Beshears et al. 2013). Misunderstanding compound interest is
another plausible explanation for low pension contributions, yet it has not drawn
much attention in this literature. I build on previous studies that analyze the
relationship between misunderstanding compound interest and saving decisions
using laboratory experiments (Eisenstein and Hoch 2007; McKenzie and
Liersch 2019) or observational data (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007b). My approach
goes further by using a field experiment to identify a causal relationship
between misunderstanding compound interest and actual pension contributions.
In addition, the psychology and economics literatures have documented many
individual biases, but whether these biases can be lessened is rarely explored.
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their erroneous understanding of compound interest through consumer
education.
1. The New Rural Social Pension Insurance Program
In 2009, the Chinese government introduced the New Rural Social Pension
Insurance Program (NRSPIP), which is a voluntary defined contribution plan
that is highly subsidized by the central and local governments. Farmers aged
16 or older who are not students and are not enrolled in an urban pension plan
are eligible for the program. An individual’s pension fund account comprises
the person’s contributions and government subsidies. In the county I study,
subjects can choose 1 of 5 annual contribution levels: 100, 200, 300, 400, or
500 RMB, which range from 2% to 8% of the county’s 2009 rural annual per
capita net income. Table 1 shows the match contributions made by the Chinese
government as subsidies.
All individual contributions and government subsidies are deposited in the
individual’s account. The interest rate is the 1-year base rate according to the
People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank), which is 2.5% as of 2011. When
the central bank changes the base rate, the pension plan’s interest rate adjusts
accordingly. Interest is compounded yearly.
Pensioners will receive their pension monthly after reaching age 60. The
amount received consists of a basic pension from the government and a portion
from the individual’s account balance. For those who are already 60 or older, if
all their eligible children living in the same village participate in the program,




Options Contribution level Percentage of annual Government subsidy
(RMB/year) per capita income (RMB/year)
1 100 1.5% 30
2 200 3.1% 30
3 300 4.6% 40
4 400 6.2% 45
5 500 7.7% 50
B. Example of pension benefit
Age when you start to contribute 30
Annual contribution level (RMB/year) 100 200 300 400 500
Annual subsidy (RMB/year) 30 30 40 45 50
A: Basic pension after age 60 (RMB/year) 960 960 960 960 960
B: Amount from individual account 299 529 781 1,023 1,264
balance (RMB/year)
C=A+B: Amount received annually after 1,259 1,489 1,741 1,983 2,224
age 60 (RMB/year)
Panel A shows the corresponding government subsidy for each contribution level in the pension plans. Panel B
provides an example to illustrate the explicit benefit of each contribution level for one who starts to contribute
at age 30 and contributes for the next 15 years. The interest rate is assumed to be 2.5%, which was the 1-year
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contributions. People between ages 45 and 60 are eligible to receive the basic
pension after age 60 if they contribute each year until they reach 60. Those
under age 45 are eligible to receive the basic pension after age 60 if they
contribute each year for at least 15 years. The current basic pension is 80 RMB
per month (960 RMB per year), which is about 18% of rural annual per capita
net income in 2009 in my study county. The basic pension level of 960 RMB
will be adjusted according to the price level of a given year.3 The monthly
pension benefit equals the individual account balance divided by 139 months.
Thus, the monthly benefit is




The new pension plans are highly subsidized by the central and local
governments.4 As an illustration, consider a farmer who is 30 years old and
contributes the minimum amount (100 RMB) each year for 15 years. Assuming
the interest rate is 2.5%, after age 60 the farmer is supposed to receive 1,259
RMB per year, of which about 82% comes from the government subsidy and its
interest. If the farmer contributes 500 RMB, approximately 56% would come
from the government subsidy. The new pension plan not only has high subsidies,
but also has high returns compared to a standard certificate of deposit (CD) from
a bank. For a person aged 45, the return on contributing the maximum amount
(500 RMB) is about 500 base points higher than the return on a CD (see Online
Appendix Table B1).
The pension program has several notable features. First, individual account
balances are not forfeited at death. If pensioners die sooner than 139 months
after age 60, their heirs will receive a lump sum payment that equals the
remaining balance in the individual account minus the government subsidies.
If pensioners live more than 139 months after age 60, they will still receive
a monthly pension as an annuity until death. Second, participants may stop
contributing for a few years and make up for the missed contributions later; they
would only lose the subsidies for the years that they did not make contribution.
Third, partial withdrawal is not allowed. They can withdraw all of their savings
under the following conditions: migration, change from a rural hukou to an
urban hukou, or enrollment in an urban pension plan.5 In any case, withdrawing
all one’s money would result in the loss of all the subsidies one was receiving.
3 The adjustment will be annually determined by the central and local governments yearly, not directly linked to
inflation. For example, the basic pension increased from 80 RMB per month to 85 RMB per month after October
1, 2013. Although for the rural pension it is too early to observe the frequent adjustments in the first few years,
I can see that in a similar government pension contract, the government has raised the basic pension for urban
employees by about 10% each year since 2005.
4 In 2010, the contribution from farmers only accounts for about 25% of the total fund in my study county. The
central government provides about 50%, and the local government provides the other 25%.
5 In China, hukou is a government system of household registration designed to control the movement of people
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2. Theoretical Framework
To explain the pattern of pension contributions, I apply a basic discrete-time,
life cycle model, augmented to incorporate uncertain lifetimes and uncertain









Xt+1 =R(Xt −Ct −Qt )+Yt+1 +Zt+1 and Xt+1 ≥0,
where Ct represents total consumption at age t , pt is the probability that the
individual at age t survives to age t +1, β is the discount factor, Xt is the cash
on hand (total liquid wealth), Qt is the contribution to the pension at age t , Yt+1
is the income at age t +1 and Zt+1 is the amount received from the pension fund
after retirement. The utility function is assumed to exhibit constant relative risk
aversion: u(C)= C1−ρ1−ρ .
To model the income uncertainty, I adopt Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
formulation and decompose the labor income into a permanent component, Pt ,
and a transitory component, Ut : Yt =PtUt and Pt =GtPt−1Nt . The transitory
shocks, Ut , are independently and identically lognormally distributed, lnUt ∼
N (0,σ 2u ). The log of the permanent component of income, lnPt , evolves as
a random walk with age-specific expected income growth, lnGt . Shocks to
the permanent component of income, Nt , are independently and identically
lognormally distributed, lnNt ∼N (0,σ 2u ).
Following Gourinchas and Parker (2002), I write the optimal consumption
rule as a function of age, t , and normalized cash on hand, xt ≡Xt/Pt . The Euler
equation is
u′(ct (xt ))=βRptE[u′(ct+1(xt+1)Gt+1Nt+1)], (2)
where ct (xt ) represents the optimal consumption rule at age t (normalized),
and lowercase letters are normalized by the permanent component of income.
I solve the dynamic programming problem by solving the Euler equation for
each contribution level. I solve optimal consumption rules for each household
based on age, time preferences, and risk attitude. Then I simulate optimal
consumption (and therefore wealth) in each period for each household. Finally,
given the optimal life cycle consumption path for each contribution level, I can
calculate the lifetime utility for each contribution level and obtain the optimal
contribution level (see Online Appendixes A.1 and A.2 for details).
Figure A2 compares distributions of actual contribution and calibrated
contribution levels. The left-hand side shows that around 90% of rural
households chose the lowest contribution level, and the right-hand side shows
the benchmark model’s prediction. The benchmark model captures some
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other aspects poorly: people save more in the calibration than what I observe
in practice.
Next, I bootstrap the confidence interval of the calibrated contribution levels.
To account for the correlation within each village, I use block bootstrap with
each village as a block. I find that the mean of the contribution level is 225
RMB, with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval [215 RMB, 236 RMB].
The average actual contribution level is 104 RMB. Therefore, these calibration
results suggest that rural households should contribute more to their pension
plans.
Given that the per capita balance of savings deposits in rural China in 2010
is about 8,765 RMB (Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking 2011), and
the return on pensions is much higher than that on savings deposits (Table
B1), why do rural households decline to allocate more savings to their high-
return pension plans? One possibility is that people underestimate compound
interest. Evidence suggests that people tend to linearize exponential functions
when assessing them intuitively (Eisenstein and Hoch 2007; Stango and Zinman
2009; McKenzie and Liersch 2019; Levy and Tasoff 2016). For savings, such
an error implies a systematic tendency to underestimate interest accrued in the
future, in which case people will underestimate the value of saving.
I introduce a structural parameter in the utility function to measure the degree
of underestimation. Consider the individual who underestimates compound
interest with the following form: f (i,t,θ)=(1+r)(1−θ )t . θ measures the degree
of underestimation of compound interest: Unbiased consumers have θ =0 and
correctly predict compound interest, while those with 0<θ <1 underestimate
it. A higher θ indicates greater underestimation of compound interest. Perceived
future values are then calculated using FV =PV ·f (i,t,θ). I incorporate
underestimation of compound interest into the life cycle consumption model.
Based on the experimental design and treatment effects, I structurally estimate
the degree of underestimation and conduct counterfactual simulations in
Section 6.
3. Experimental Design and Survey Data
The standard practice by which rural pensions are offered involves two
steps: registration and payment. In step 1, county coordinators hire village
coordinators to visit households in person to deliver information about the
pension plan. Households then decide whether they would like to participate in
the plan and, if so, at what level they will contribute. In step 2, households pay
the given amount to village coordinators within 1 month. County coordinators
then collect the list of participants and their contributions from village
coordinators and administrate individual accounts for all participants with the
banks.
I collaborated with a county government in Shaanxi province during the
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pension plan in 2010, and many residents made their first contributions in the
same year. In 2011, 14 villages from the sample county were randomly selected
as experimental sites. In these sample villages, instead of village coordinators
calling on households, a research team visited them in step 1 and followed a
protocol similar to that used by village coordinators in villages not included in
the sample. I asked households to choose a contribution level, and provide their
information to the village coordinators. In step 2, they pay the given amount
to village coordinators within the next month. I collected administrative data
from village coordinators after the households had made their contributions in
2011; the data include name, gender, age, village, and the contribution levels
for both 2010 (baseline data) and 2011 (experimental data).
The procedures above have two advantages. First, this study takes place in a
naturally occurring environment: I build on the infrastructure of the government
and offer the same pension plan the government would offer in any case. Key
changes are that participants are given a chance to participate in a survey,
in addition to making a choice about their contribution level. Farmers are
familiar with the logistics of separate registration and payment, because such
procedures are typical in this area; also, local representatives had visited them
the previous year to explain the pension program. Second, because I collected
data about participants’ actual contribution levels, I was able to test the impact
of explaining compound interest on actual pension contributions.6
Figure 1 presents the experimental design. Randomization of intervention
was conducted at the household level. Households were randomly assigned
to 1 of 3 groups: the Control group, the Calculation group, or the Education
group. Assignment of treatment was determined by the order of interviews for
each enumerator, and the order of interviews was determined by the location of
households along village roads. Enumerators were assigned to different roads
in the villages and conducted door-to-door visits from the beginning of the
road to the end under the guidance of village coordinators. For example, the
first household on the road was assigned to the control group, the second to the
calculation group, the third to the education group, and the fourth to the control
group to begin the cycle again. The assignment rule, which was the same for
all enumerators, helped to control for village fixed effects and enumerator fixed
effects.
In the control group, enumerators gave households a flyer about the pension
plan and went over information about the contract. Households were then asked
to fill out the short survey about their age, education, wealth, family members,
risk attitudes, time preferences, and financial literacy. At the end of the visit,
6 About 1% of households did not adhere to the contribution level they chose at registration and paid a different
amount when village coordinators collected contributions. Changing contribution levels does not incur a penalty;
only households themselves and village coordinators need to file some paperwork. I believe that the low rate
of changed contribution levels is likely due to participants being familiar with the standard practices used to
implement various social programs in rural China and carefully deciding on their contribution level. I will focus
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Figure 1
Experimental design
enumerators asked households to state their contribution decision. Households
were informed that their decisions would be passed to local village coordinators,
who would later collect the contributions based on registration in the program.
In the calculation group, enumerators followed the same procedure as the
control group, but before administering the survey about preference, they
calculated the expected pension benefits after age 60 if households contributed
at various levels beginning at age 30. Table 1, panel B, provides the expected
benefits. Enumerators went over the benefits at each contribution level with
households and explained the range of differences; the purpose was to inform
households of the explicit benefit amount at each contribution level without
explaining the concept of compound interest. Comparing the control group and
the calculation group will suggest whether explaining the benefits in general
can increase participation and contribution levels in pension plans.
In the education group, the enumerators followed the same procedure for the
control group, but then asked questions about compound interest, explained the
concept, and provided the calculated benefit for each contribution level before
administering the survey about preference. I asked three compound interest
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You deposit 100 RMB as a certificate of deposit this year at
a constant interest rate of 9% per year. Interest is compounded
annually. How much money could you receive in 30 years? (1)
Less than 300, (2) 300–500, (3) 500–1,000, (4) 1,000–1,500, or
(5) more than 1,500?
Regardless of the participant’s answers, the enumerator furnished the correct
answer: 1,327 RMB (option 4). The enumerator then briefly explained the
basic concept of compound interest in a manner similar to Eisenstein and Hoch
(2007): “Compound interest means that when interest is earned, it is left in the
account. In future years, interest accumulates on the full amount that is in the
account, so you earn interest on the interest as well as on the original principal
amount.”
Table 3, panel A, provides the other two questions. Enumerators varied
the interest rate (9% and 2.5%) and the number of years before receiving
the benefits (30 years and 15 years) so that households would have a better
understanding of compound interest. The purpose of this approach is, first,
to document whether households underestimate the value of savings from
compound interest, and second, to explain compound interest in order to debias
them. Note that the questions asked are complex, and I am simply aiming to
crudely measure subjects’ understanding of compound interest. I also calculated
expected benefits after age 60, which are the same for the calculation group.
In summary, the calculation treatment provides households with information
about the expected benefits at each contribution level. The education treatment
asks households to estimate interest, explains compound interest, and provides
information about its benefits.
Risk attitudes and time preferences were elicited using the questions outlined
in Online Appendix Table A2.7 These will help us to calibrate the life
cycle model and conduct structural estimation. I also asked five questions
to measure numeracy and financial literacy (Table 3, panel B, provides these
questions, which were adopted from Banks, O’Dea, and Oldfiel 2010, Lusardi
and Mitchell 2007a, Eisenstein and Hoch 2007, and Cole et al. 2012). As
described previously, the survey about preference, which includes questions
about financial literacy, was administered after the interventions in the education
and calculation groups. I used a between-subject design based on random
assignment. Comparison of the education group with the other groups allows
us to test whether education changes financial literacy.8
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the different groups. I visited a
total of 1,330 households; of these, 177 did not answer the door, 32 declined
to participate in this study, and 17 households were not eligible but were
mistakenly surveyed. Therefore, the sample contains 1,104 surveys. The overall
7 Both time preferences and risk attitudes are elicited without monetary incentive.
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Table 2
Summary statistics
Total Control Calculation Education p-value
treatment treatment
A. Baseline
Male 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.67 .22
(0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47)
Age 44.90 44.87 44.40 45.42 .30
(9.18) (9.66) (9.00) (8.84)
Years of schooling 8.69 8.71 8.67 8.70 .97
(2.50) (2.56) (2.56) (2.40)
Household size 4.78 4.80 4.82 4.73 .66
(1.34) (1.37) (1.38) (1.29)
Land for production 3.75 3.75 3.76 3.73 .98
(1.61) (1.66) (1.59) (1.57)
Own business 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.13 .32
(0.34) (0.36) (0.32) (0.34)
Own a car 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.06 .00
(0.30) (0.34) (0.31) (0.24)
Own a motorcycle 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.40 .09
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Saving for children 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.80 .50
(0.39) (0.40) (0.38) (0.40)
Saving for future when she/he is old 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 .92
(0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43)
Have a private pension plan 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 .83
(0.34) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33)
Receiving reimbursement from 0.91 0.93 0.90 0.91 .53
government health insurance
(0.28) (0.25) (0.31) (0.28)
Baseline take-up 0.93 0.92 0.93 0.94 .34
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.23)
Baseline contribution level 104.17 104.57 106.34 101.63 .57
(65.28) (71.23) (70.03) (53.14)
B. Post-intervention
Risk aversion 4.04 4.11 3.98 4.03 .56
(1.68) (1.65) (1.71) (1.69)
Patience 2.82 2.64 2.86 2.95 .26
(2.61) (2.64) (2.61) (2.59)
Absolute distance to the correct answer to question 1 −1.08 −1.13 −1.06 −1.07 .58
(0.99) (1.00) (0.98) (0.99)
Absolute distance to the correct answer to question 2 −1.72 −1.73 −1.74 −1.68 .72
(1.00) (1.00) (0.97) (1.01)
Absolute distance to the correct answer to question 3 −2.95 −3.05 −2.92 −2.89 .06
(1.09) (1.00) (1.20) (1.13)
Absolute distance to the correct answer to question 4 −0.80 −0.82 −0.790 −0.78 .78
(0.99) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99)
Absolute distance to the correct answer to question 5 −1.55 −1.59 −1.53 −1.53 .59
(1.00) (1.00) (0.98) (1.01)
Take-up 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 .83
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.12)
Contribution level 157.16 133.06 156.19 182.38 .00
(123.72) (96.62) (125.19) (140.80)
Observations 1,104 372 363 369
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Baseline take-up and baseline contribution are the actual pension
participation and contributions before my intervention in 2010. Absolute distance to the correct answer to
questions 1–5 is normalized by standard deviation of the control group. p-values are for Wald test of equal means
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nonresponse rate was 17.0%; differences in nonresponse rates between groups
are not statistically significant. The sample county launched the rural pension
plan in 2010 (baseline), before my interventions in 2011. The take-up rate in
2010 was 93%, and the average contribution was 104 RMB (which includes
those who did not participate), so most households participated in the pension
plans but chose the lowest contribution level. The last column shows the
p-values for the Wald test of equal means of the three groups. Most control
variables are balanced between different treatment groups.
Table 3 presents results for financial literacy. More than half answered
question 4 correctly, which suggests that they have a basic understanding of
inflation and purchasing power. Thirteen percent answered question 2 correctly,
and 5.6% answered question 3 correctly, which suggests that most subjects have
a poor understanding of compound interest.
4. Empirical Results
In this section, I first show that rural households underestimate the value of
savings with compound interest, then demonstrate that financial education about
compound interest can increase households’ contribution levels. I also analyze
possible channels for the effects of financial education about compound interest
on pension contributions.
4.1 Misunderstanding of compound interest
I measure misunderstanding of compound interest using the compound interest
question A that preceded the intervention in the education group. Figure 2
shows responses to the question.
Of 369 households in the education group, 201 could not answer the question.
Figure 2 includes only the 155 households that answered the question. The
correct answer is 1,327 RMB (option 4). Eighteen percent chose the correct
answer, and 73% chose options 1, 2, or 3; these can be characterized as
underestimating the value of compound interest. A further 9% chose option
5, which can be characterized as overestimating the value of compound
interest. From Figure 2, I see that rural households underestimate the value of
savings with compound interest. Although the compound interest questions are
different, the results are consistent with those of Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b),
who find that only 18% of subjects in the Health and Retirement Study answered
the compound interest question correctly.
Online Appendix Figure A1 shows responses to compound interest questions
B and C. For question B, 26% underestimated the value of compound interest.
For question C, 59% underestimated the value of compound interest. Responses
to all three compound interest questions suggest that a significant portion of
rural households underestimate compound interest, even at a relatively low
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Total Control Education Treatment Calculation Treatment
Question %answer %correct %answer %correct %answer %correct %answer %correct
A. Questions used during the education treatment
a You deposit 100 RMB as a Certificate of Deposit this year at a constant interest
rate of 9% per year. Interest is compounded annually. How much money could 42.0 7.6
you receive in 30 years?
1) Less than 300 2) 300-500 3) 500-1000 4) 1000-1500 5) More than 1500
b Suppose you were 45 years old and you deposit 100 RMB every year for 15
years at a constant interest rate of 2.5% per year. Interest is compounded 30.6 14.1
annually. How much could you withdraw when you are 60 years old?
1) Less than 1800 2) 1800-2000 3) 2000-2500 4) 2500-3000 5) More than 3000
c Suppose you were 30 years old and you deposit 100 RMB every year for 15
years at a constant interest rate of 2.5% per year. Interest is compounded 29.3 7.3
annually. How much could you withdraw when you are 60 years old?
1) Less than 1800 2) 1800-2000 3) 2000-2500 4) 2500-3000 5) More than 3000
B. Post-intervention questions
1 A second hand car is selling at 60000 RMB, which is 2/3 of the new one. What is the price
of a new car? 58.4 34.7 56.5 33.9 58.8 35.8 60.1 34.4
1) 90000 2) 40000 3) 80000 4) 120000 5) 180000 6) other
2 If you borrowed 100000 RMB from the bank, the interest rate is 2% per month and
compounded monthly. How much do you owe the bank in three months? 37.9 13.0 36.0 12.6 38.8 14.4 38.8 12.1
1) Less than 102000 2) 102000 3) 102000-106000 4) 106000 5) More than 106000
3 You deposit 100 RMB as a Certificate of Deposit this year at a constant interest rate of 6%
per year. Interest is compounded annually. How much money could you receive in 30 years? 33.4 5.6 29.8 3.5 35.0 7.0 35.5 6.3
1) Less than 300 2) 300-400 3) 400-500 4) 500-600 5) More than 600
4 You deposited 10000 RMB in the bank and the interest rate is 2% per year. If the price level
increases 3% per year, can you buy more than, less than, or the same amount of goods in 1 70.5 57.7 69.6 56.2 71.0 59.1 70.8 57.9
year as you could today?
5 You have two choices if you want to borrow 500000 RMB from the bank. Bank 1 requires
you to pay back 600000 RMB in one month. Bank 2 requires you to pay back in one month 52.5 22.8 49.7 22.0 53.1 24.1 54.8 22.3
500000 RMB plus 15% interest. Which bank represents a better deal for you?
Observations 1,104 1,104 372 372 369 369 363 363
The %answer equals the number of subjects who respond to the question divided by the number of observations in that column. The %correct equals the number of subjects who answer the
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Figure 2
Response to compound interest question
This figure shows the distribution of responses to the compound interest rate question before intervention. I asked
subjects the following question: You deposit 100 RMB as a certificate of deposit this year at a constant interest
rate of 9% per year. Interest is compounded annually. How much money could you receive in 30 years? (1) Less
than 300, (2) 300–500, (3) 500–1,000, (4) 1,000–1,500, or (5) more than 1,500? 1, 2, 3, underestimate; 4, correct;
5, overestimate.
4.2 Impact of education on pension contributions
Figure 3, panel A, shows that almost all the households in the three groups
participated in the pension plan and that there is no significant treatment
effect. Figure 3, panel B, shows the treatment effect on contributions. In the
control group, the average contribution is 133 RMB. In the calculation group,
the average contribution increases to 156 RMB. In the education group, the
average contribution increases to 182 RMB. These results suggest that both the
education treatment and the calculation treatment increase contribution levels,
but that the education treatment is more effective.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of contribution levels for different groups.
Contribution level 1 corresponds to 100 RMB contributions, and contribution
levels 2 to 5 range from 200 RMB to 500 RMB. After the intervention, most
subjects still contribute 100 RMB in the pension. In the education group,
however, more subjects contribute 300 RMB and 500 RMB relative to the
other two groups.
I estimate the treatment effect on contributions through an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression:
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Figure 3
Treatment effects
Panel A shows the treatment effect on take-up of pension plans. In the control group, take-up is 98.4%. In
the calculation group, take-up is 98.1%. In the education group, take-up is 98.6%. This suggests that almost
all the households in the three groups participate in the pension plans. Panel B shows the treatment effect on
contributions to pension plans.
where qij is the contribution levels after my intervention in 2011 or the
changes in contribution levels from 2010 to 2011 for household i in natural
village j .9 T eij is an indicator for the education treatment and T cij is an
9
“Natural village” refers to the actual village, whereas “administrative village” refers to a bureaucratic entity that
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Figure 4
Distributions of contribution levels
This figure shows the distribution of contribution levels for different groups. Contribution level 1 corresponds to
100 RMB, and levels 2 to 5 correspond to 200 RMB to 500 RMB.
indicator for the calculation treatment. Random assignment implies that βe
is an unbiased estimate of the reduced-form intention-to-treat (ITT) education
treatment effect, and βc is an unbiased estimate of the ITT calculation treatment
effect. Xij are household characteristics (e.g., gender, age, years of education,
household size, land for production, car ownership). αj and αk are village fixed
effects and enumerator fixed effects, respectively. Table 4 reports results. Note
that empirical analyses in Tables 4–6 include subjects who did not answer the
financial literacy question.
In Column 1, the dependent variable is individual take-up after intervention.
There is no evidence of a treatment effect on take-up. This could potentially
be due to a high participation rate. In Column 2, the dependent variable is
the individual contribution level after intervention. Variables on the right-
hand side are treatment indicators, socioeconomic variables, and the fixed
effects of natural villages and enumerators. The education treatment increases
the contribution by 53 RMB—an increase of 40% relative to the average
contribution of 133 RMB in the control group—and is significant at the 1%
level. The effect of the calculation treatment (25.22) is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level. The impact of the education treatment is greater than
that of the calculation treatment, and the Wald test shows that it is significant at
the 1% level. In Column 3, the dependent variable is changes in individual
contribution level from 2010 to 2011, and I run the same regression from







/rfs/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/rfs/hhz074/5530608 by Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity user on 16 D
ecem
ber 2019
[15:48 29/7/2019 RFS-OP-REVF190082.tex] Page: 18 1–34
The Review of Financial Studies / v 00 n 0 2019
Table 4
Effect of education and calculation on contribution level
Specification: OLS regression
Dep. var.: Individual Individual Change in Individual contribution
adoption of contribution contribution level of pension
pension level of pension level of pension
Sample: All sample Control and
education
1 2 3 4 5
Education 0.004 53.06 54.57 68.71 55.6
(0.009) (9.28)∗∗∗ (8.94)∗∗∗ (14.85)∗∗∗ (10.87)∗∗∗
Calculation −0.002 25.22 22.34 18.68
(0.009) (9.24)∗∗∗ (8.13)∗∗∗ (12.97)
Education*Overestimation (option 5) −78.16
(28.81)∗∗∗
Education*Correct estimation (option 4) −26.19
(47.85)
Education*Underestimation (option 3) −3.03
(53.39)
Education*Underestimation (option 2) −33.01
(36.43)









p-value .5009 .0064∗∗∗ .0004∗∗∗
Obs. 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 741
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of dep. var. for omitted treatment: 0.0984 133.06 28.49 133.06 133.06
Fixed effects for village and enumerator Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.0648 0.0895 0.0963 0.2295 0.1546
Standard errors are clustered by ninety-three natural villages. Robust standard errors are clustered and in
parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01. In Column 1, the dependent variable is individual pension participation.
In Columns 2, 4, and 5, the dependent variable is individual contribution level after my intervention in 2011.
In Columns 3, the dependent variable is changes in individual contribution level from 2010 to 2011. In Column
5, I restrict the sample to the control group and the education group only. βe is the coefficient of the education
treatment and βc is the coefficient of the calculation treatment.
those in Column 2. In Column 4, I study the heterogeneous effect with respect
to the baseline contribution in 2010. Coefficients of the interaction between
treatment indicators and baseline contribution are not significantly different
from zero. This suggests that treatment effects are similar across different initial
contributions. Online Appendix B3 reports the robustness analysis and shows
that the main results in Table 4 are robust to different specifications.
To bridge the gap between the theoretical framework and empirical results,
I calculate the degree to which these treatment effects can explain the gap
between the control group and the level implied by the benchmark model. I find
that the treatment effect accounts for 55% of the gap between the control group
and the benchmark model prediction, with a 95% bootstrap confidence interval
[31%, 77%]. This suggests that my interventions reduce the gap between actual
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To study the long-run effect, I also collect the new administrative data for
pension contributions in the year 2018 and merge the administrative data with
the existing data set. The administrative data includes information about name,
gender, age, village, and the contribution levels in the year 2018. Equation
(3) estimates the long-run effect. I find that the pension contribution in the
education treatment is still 45 RMB larger than that in the control group and
is significant at the 1% level. The difference between the calculation treatment
and the control group is 21 RMB and statistically significant at the 5% level.
Only 9% of participants change their pension contribution in the long run. This
is likely due to inertia when choosing their pension plans (Madrian and Shea
2001). These results suggest that the long-run effect is similar to the short-run
effect in Table 4, and the effect on contribution persists over time.
In sum, the education treatment increases the contribution by 49–53 RMB,
resulting in an increase of around 37%–40% relative to the average contribution
of 133 RMB in the control group.10 The effect on contribution persists over
time. This suggests that the financial education has a positive and significant
effect on retirement savings for rural households.
4.3 Possible channels
For these findings to inform theory, more information is needed to analyze
the mechanisms through which this effect could work. Possible explanations
include: (1) learning the expected benefits of pensions through a better
understanding of compound interest and (2) learning the expected benefits
of pensions in general. Grasping the difference between the two channels
is important: it will help us understand the factors involved in pension
contributions and design better interventions to improve decisions about
household retirement savings. Moreover, understanding individual bias about
compound interest has important implications in other household finance
decisions, such as life cycle consumption (Levy and Tasoff 2016). The
experiment is designed to distinguish between these mechanisms.
4.3.1 Learning the concept of compound interest. People may underes-
timate the value of savings from compound interest, and thus contribute
less to their pension plans. Financial education might increase household
contribution levels by helping households correct their erroneous understanding
of compound interest. If learning about the concept of compound interest
can explain the treatment effects, I should have several predictions. First, the
treatment effects should depend on the initial understanding of compound
10 Intertemporal consumption theory suggests that changes in expected return have two effects: a substitution
effect and an income effect. For a net saver, the increase in expected return may increase or decrease current
consumption and thus decrease or increase current savings. If the observed effects are, in fact, effects on total
savings, this would imply that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. The results do not speak to
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interest: those who overestimate compound interest should have smaller
treatment effects compared to those who underestimate compound interest.
Second, I should observe that the education treatment has larger effects than
the calculation treatment, because the only difference between these two groups
is that the education treatment explains compound interest. Third, the education
treatment should increase their understanding of compound interest, but should
have no effect on other financial literacy questions.
I first analyze heterogeneous treatment effects. In Table 4, Column 5, I
study the heterogeneous treatment effects based on the initial understanding of
compound interest. The measurement of compound interest in the calculation
group is affected by the intervention, so I restrict my sample to the control group
and the education group only. I create five indicators based on the participant’s
choice on question A before the treatment in the education group or question 3
in the control group. These indicators measure subjects’ initial understanding
of compound interest, because subjects do not receive any treatment before
answering the questions.
I find that the effect of the education treatment is 56 RMB for those who were
unable to provide an answer to the compound interest question. However, the
treatment effect is 78 RMB smaller if they overestimate compound interest. The
effect of the interaction term is significant at the 1% level. In fact, those who
overestimate compound interest reduce their contributions by about 22 RMB
after the education treatment, though this is not statistically significant (p = .42).
The treatment effect is 30 RMB if they correctly estimate compound interest
(p = .54), and 70 RMB for those who have the lowest range of estimation
(p = .06). Although the treatment effect is not monotonic as participants
underestimate more, the pattern is clear: the treatment effect is larger for
those who underestimate compound interest than for those who overestimate
compound interest. Hence, the evidence is consistent with understanding the
concept of compound interest.
Second, I study the comparison between the education group and the
calculation group. There could be two explanations for the different treatment
effects between the education and calculation groups. First, explaining why the
benefit is large might increase the credibility of the described benefits. Second,
the education treatment might increase the ability to link the described benefits
of beginning to contribute at age 30 to their own choices. In the calculation
treatment, I calculated participants’ expected pension benefit levels if they
contributed at various levels starting from age 30. As such, those who are around
30 can learn the expected benefits directly from the calculation treatment.
Those who are closer to 40 or 50, however, only learn the expected benefit
for participants who begin at age 30 and, as a result, must link those benefits to
their own choices. Therefore, the second explanation has two predictions: (1)
the calculation treatment should have similar treatment effects as the education
treatment for those around age 30, because teaching compound interest does
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treatment should have lower treatment effects than the education treatment
when age increases, because teaching compound interest increases subjects’
ability to link the described benefits at age 30 to their own choices. Then I can
use the treatment effects for different ages to distinguish these two hypotheses.
Figure 5 shows the treatment effects of the education and calculation groups
for different ages. In Figure 5, panel A, the dependent variable is the individual
level contribution. In Figure 5, panel B, the dependent variable is the change
in the individual’s contribution level.
I find that the treatment effects of the education and calculation groups are
similar for those who are around age 30, but differ when age increases. The
treatment effect of the calculation group is lower than that of the education
group for those who are around ages 40, 50, and 60.
I estimate the effects of the education and calculation treatments by age
group:
qij =αj +αk +
4∑
k=2
βk ·T kij +
4∑
k=1
βk ·T ekij +
4∑
k=1
βck ·T ckij +φ ·Xij +ij , (4)
where k is the indicator of age group. k equals 1, 2, 3, or 4 for those in age
groups 25–35, 35–45, 45–55, and 55–60, respectively. T kij , T ekij , and T ckij
are indicators for age group k in the control group, the education group, and the
calculation group, respectively. Therefore, the treatment effects of the education
and calculation groups in age group 1 are β1 and βc1. The treatment effects
of the education and calculation groups in age group k (k =1) are βk −βk and
βck −βk .
Table 5, panel A, reports the results for the four age groups. In Column 1,
the dependent variable is the individual-level contribution. For those who are
around age 30, the difference between the treatment effects of the education
and calculation groups is 11 RMB and is insignificant. The differences are 15,
42, and 44 RMB for those who are around age 40, 50, and 60, respectively. The
difference is significant at the 5% level for those who are around age 50, and it
is close to marginally significant for those who are around age 60 (p = .1179). In
Column 2, the dependent variable is the change in individual-level contribution.
The results are similar to Column 1. Differences between the treatment effects
of the education and calculation groups are significant at least at the 5% level
for those who are around ages 50 to 60. Table 5, panel B, also analyzes the
results for two age groups to check robustness, and results are similar to panel
A. Differences between the treatment effects of the education and calculation
groups are 37–41 RMB for those who are between ages 40 and 60, and are
significant at the 1% level.
I also investigate the qualitative explanation for participants’ contribution
decisions using the same specification in Table 5. I find that the likelihood
of subjects basing their contribution decisions on learning the benefits of
compound interest is greater in the education group than in the calculation
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Figure 5
Treatment effects by age
Panel A shows treatment effects for the education and calculation groups by age group. The dependent variable
is individual level contribution. The horizontal axis represents four age groups. The vertical axis is the treatment
effects. I report one standard error for each coefficient. Panel B shows the treatment effects for the education
and calculation groups by age groups. The dependent variable is change in individual level contribution. The
horizontal axis represents four age groups. The vertical axis is treatment effects.
Third, I study the impact of my interventions on the understanding of
compound interest. Figure 6 shows the responses to the compound interest
question (question 3) after the intervention in different groups. I only include
the 369 households that answered the question. The correct answer is 574 RMB,
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Table 5
Effect of education and calculation on contribution level by age group
Specification: OLS regression
Dep. var.: Change in
individual
Individual contribution level
contribution level of pension
Sample: All sample
1 2
A. Four age groups
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 25 and 35 (βe1) 51.89 37.48
(26.47)∗ (20.90)∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 25 and 35 (βc1) 40.76 35.68
(25.79) (22.60)
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 35 and 45 (βe2-β2) 60.88 65.52
(16.61)∗∗∗ (16.83)∗∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 35 and 45 (βc1-β2) 46.07 41.35
(14.41)∗∗∗ (13.06)∗∗∗
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 45 and 55 (βe3-β3) 50.20 61.70
(15.65)∗∗∗ (14.19)∗∗∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 45 and 55 (βc3-β3) 7.79 16.49
(12.70) (8.81)∗
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 55 and 60 (βe4-β4) 49.62 42.09
(26.41)∗ (23.40)∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 55 and 60 (βc4-β4) 5.71 −13.65
(21.93) (15.81)
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 25 and 35 0.6982 0.9460
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 35 and 45 0.4358 0.1947
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 45 and 55 0.0136∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 55 and 60 0.1179 0.0269∗∗
B. Two age groups
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 20 and 40 55.34 49.11
(18.03)∗∗∗ (17.01)∗∗∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 20 and 40 43.16 35.35
(17.34)∗∗ (16.97)∗∗
Effect of the education treatment for those between age 40 and 60 50.05 55.25
(11.46)∗∗∗ (11.18)∗∗∗
Effect of the calculation treatment for those between age 40 and 60 13.93 14.54
(10.49) (8.10)∗
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 20 and 40 0.5065 0.4406
Prob > F(Education=Calculation) for those between age 40 and 60 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗∗
Standard errors are clustered by ninety-three natural villages. Robust standard errors are clustered and in
parentheses. *p <.1; **p <.05; ***p <.01. Panel A reports the results for four age groups. Panel B reports
the results for two age groups as a test for robustness. In Column 1, the dependent variable is the individual level
contribution. In Column 2, the dependent variable is the change in the individual level contribution.
the value of savings from compound interest after the intervention. Although
underestimation of compound interest persists after the intervention, there are
fewer extremely wrong answers (option 1) and more correct answers (option
4) in the education group than in the other groups.
To estimate the treatment effect on financial literacy, I follow the specification
in Equation 1 and change the dependent variable to financial literacy. I use
absolute distance to the correct answer to measure financial literacy. Absolute
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Figure 6
Response to compound interest question
This figure shows the distribution of responses to the compound interest question after intervention. I asked
subjects the following question: You deposit 100 RMB as a certificate of deposit this year at a constant interest
rate of 6% per year. Interest is compounded annually. How much money could you receive in 30 years? (1)
Less than 300, (2) 300–400, (3) 400–500, (4) 500–600, or (5) more than 600? Figures only include those who
answered the question and exclude those who did not know. 1, 2, 3, underestimate; 4, correct; 5, overestimate.
even when they are incorrect. This can help to measure the magnitude of
misunderstanding of compound interest. I take the negative sign of the measure
so that the higher the measure, the better the understanding of compound
interest. Table 2, panel B, reports summary statistics.
Table 6 presents results. I run a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
with five financial literacy questions. In Columns 1 to 5, the dependent
variables are the absolute distance between the chosen answer and the correct
answer for questions 1 to 5 (which are shown in Table 3), normalized by
the standard deviation of the control group. Because the information in
the education treatment includes only compound interest, I predict that the
education treatment increases understanding of compound interest but has no
effect on numeracy questions or inflation questions. I find that the effects of
education on the financial literacy questions are all positive, but most are not
significant. The only exception is question 3, the compound interest question.
In Column 3, the effect is positive and significant at the 5% level. Therefore,
education reduces the distance from the correct answer by about one-sixth
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Effect of the education and calculation interventions on financial literacy
Specification: SUR regression
Dep. var.: Absolute distance to the correct answer Average standardized effect on absolute
distance to the correct answer
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 Question 5 Question 2 Question 1, 4 All questions
and 3 and 5
Sample: All sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Education 0.078 0.062 0.186 0.053 0.061 0.124 0.064 0.088
(0.067) (0.069) (0.074)∗∗ (0.068) (0.068) (0.063)∗∗ (0.049) (0.048)∗
Calculation 0.071 −0.011 0.120 0.029 0.043 0.055 0.048 0.051
(0.067) (0.069) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.057) (0.046) (0.045)
Obs. 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104
Omitted treatment Control
Mean of dep. var. for omitted treatment: −1.13 −1.73 −3.06 −0.83 −1.60
Social-economic variables Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed effects for village and enumerator Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.1752 0.1550 0.1632 0.1446 0.1545
In Columns 1 to 5, the dependent variables are the absolute distance between the chosen answers and the correct answers for questions 1 to 5, normalized by the standard
deviation of the control group. Column 6 reports average standardized treatment effects on questions 2 and 3, of which both are compound interest questions. Column 7 reports
average standardized treatment effects on questions 1, 4 and 5, of which none of them are related to compound interest. Column 8 reports average standardized treatment
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people’s understanding of compound interest.11 Robustness checks suggest
that other measures of financial literacy show similar results (Online Appendix
B.4 provides a complete description of the measurement of absolute distance
and robustness checks).
To illustrate the impact of the intervention on overall financial literacy, I
follow Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) and construct average standardized
treatment effects. In Columns 6 to 8, I report average standardized treatment
effects on three combinations of questions. In Column 6, I report average
standardized treatment effects on questions 2 and 3, both of which are
compound interest questions. The effect of financial education is positive and
significant at the 5% level. In Column 7, I report average standardized treatment
effects on questions 1, 4, and 5, which are unrelated to compound interest.
The effect of financial education is positive but not significant. In Column 8, I
report average standardized treatment effects on all questions, which is positive
and significant at the 10% level. This suggests that financial education has a
positive and significant effect on overall financial literacy, and especially on
the understanding of compound interest.
In sum, I find that the treatment effect of the education group is larger for
those who underestimate compound interest than for those who overestimate
compound interest. I also find that the treatment effect of the education group
is greater than that of the calculation group for older subjects. The likelihood
of subjects basing their contribution decisions on learning the benefits of
compound interest is greater in the education group than in the calculation
group for older subjects. These results support the notion that the different
treatment effects of the education and calculation groups are likely due
to participants’ ability to link the benefit to their own choices. Moreover,
although rural households underestimate compound interest and contribute less
to pension plans, education about compound interest can improve people’s
understanding of compound interest. Therefore, these results demonstrate that
the understanding of compound interest is the main channel for the treatment
effects.
4.3.2 Alternative explanations for treatment effects. An alternative
explanation is that learning the benefits of a pension in general can fully
explain the effect of the education treatment, because the education group
also provides benefit calculation. As discussed in Table 4, the impact of the
education treatment is greater than the calculation treatment, and it is significant
11 Note that the impact of the calculation group on the understanding of compound interest question is not clear.
If the information provided in the calculation group surprises the participants and thus changes their behavior, it
is likely the participants can infer that they have underestimated the calculation of long-term benefit previously.
Thus, it is possible that more participants answer the compound interest questions correctly in the calculation
group. I find that, the difference between the calculation group and the control group is not statistically significant
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at the 1% level. The difference between these two interventions indicates that
households acquire information about compound interest during the education.
Thus, learning the benefits of a pension cannot fully explain the treatment effect
of the education group.
Another concern is that enumerators could have put more effort into just
persuading households in the treatment groups to contribute more to the pension
plan, without explaining the compound interest. However, stronger persuasion
is unlikely to explain the better understanding of compound interest after the
education treatment. Moreover, there are no incentives for enumerators when
participants contribute either more or less. Enumerators are instructed that the
contribution is voluntary and that they should not push participants to contribute
more or less.
Another explanation is that enumerators provide a more intensive treatment
when they perceive that participants are more biased. This is consistent with the
finding that the treatment effect is larger for those who underestimate compound
interest. To test this explanation, I study the enumerators’ efforts when they
interact with participants with different degrees of bias. Although I do not
have a direct measure of treatment effort for the education group, I have some
suggestive evidence to show this is unlikely to be true. First, the main prediction
of enumerators’ biased treatment is that enumerators should spend more time
explaining the question to more biased participants. I use the number of minutes
enumerators required to administer the survey as a proxy for effort and find that
the average time is 28–30 minutes for those with a different initial understanding
of compound interest in the education group. Thus, there is no evidence that
enumerators’ biased treatment can explain the larger effects of more biased
participants. Moreover, enumerators were asked to follow the instructions and
provide similar treatment intensity to those in the education group, in order to
minimize any effect from enumerators.
5. Structural Estimation
The experiment demonstrates that the education treatment increases both
understanding of compound interest and pension contributions. In this section,
I bridge the gap between the theoretical framework and experimental results
by formally estimating risk aversion parameters, time preferences parameters,
and parameters of underestimating compound interest in a life cycle model. The
experimental design has two advantages to conduct the structural estimation
with a life cycle model. First, I have experimental variation in financial
education, which allows us to identify the parameters in different treatment
groups. Second, I use survey questions to elicit preferences and combine
these data with actual pension contributions (Ameriks et al. 2011; Koijen, Van
Nieuwerburgh, and Yogo 2016). Thus, I can jointly estimate preference and
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Risk aversion ρ 1.54 1.64
(0.032) (0.019)
Discount factor β 0.94 0.95
(0.034) (0.083)
Exponential growth bias in the control group θ1 0.67
(0.001)
Exponential growth bias in the education group θ2 0.09
(0.001)
Mean of the logarithm of exponential growth bias in the control group μ1 −0.04
(0.012)
Mean of the logarithm of exponential growth bias in the education group μ2 −2.04
(0.015)
Standard deviation of the logarithm of exponential growth bias σ 1.07
(0.022)
B. Distribution of coefficients
Mean of exponential growth bias in the control group 0.50
Standard deviation of exponential growth bias in the control group 0.25
Mean of exponential growth bias in the education group 0.07
Standard deviation of exponential growth bias in the education group 0.03
C. Counterfactual simulation Pension contribution (RMB)
Baseline 155
Increase the subsidy by 100% 158
Financial education 177
I use both survey data and actual pension contributions from the experimental data to estimate risk aversion
parameters, time preference parameters, and parameters of underestimating compound interest. Column 1
estimates four parameters: the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ; the discount factor, β; the magnitude
of underestimating compound interest in the control group, θ1; and the magnitude of underestimating compound
interest in the control group, θ2. Column 2 assumes that the parameters of underestimating compound interest are
lognormally distributed in both the education group and the control groups and estimate five parameters. μ1 and σ
are the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of exponential growth bias in the control group, and μ2 and
σ are the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of exponential growth bias in the education group. Panel A
reports the estimated coefficients. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel B reports the distribution of
coefficients by taking draws from the coefficients in panel A. Panel C reports the simulated pension contribution
based on three counterfactual scenarios. The first scenario is the baseline when all subjects underestimate the
benefit of compound interest. In the second scenario, I consider the subsidy policy that increases the existing
subsidy by 100%. In the third scenario, I provide financial education about compound interest, which reduces
the exponential growth bias by the same as in my experiment.
I use both survey data and actual pension contributions from the experimental
data to estimate risk aversion parameters, time preference parameters, and
parameters of underestimating compound interest, and Table 7 reports the
results. The measurement of compound interest in the calculation group is
affected by the intervention, so I restrict my sample to the control group
and the education group only. I estimate two specifications. In specification
1, I attempt to recover the values of four key preference parameters: the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ; the discount factor, β; the magnitude
of underestimating compound interest in the control group, θ1; and the
magnitude of underestimating compound interest in the education group, θ2.
The estimation is based on twenty-five moment conditions: five from risk
attitude questions, six from time preference questions, twelve from compound
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and one from actual pension contributions in the education group (see Online
Appendix A.4 for calculations about moment conditions). The parameter
estimates, 	ˆ=(ρˆ,βˆ,θˆ1,θˆ2) , minimize the generalized distance of the sample
moments from zero.
Column 1 shows the results for specification 1. The estimated coefficient
of relative-risk aversion is 1.54. The estimate is close to that of Gourinchas
and Parker (2002), but lower than previous estimates without heterogeneity in
risk aversion (DeNardi, French, and Jones 2010; Koijen, Van Nieuwerburgh,
and Yogo 2016). The estimated discount factor is 0.94, which is close to the
estimates in the literature. The exponential growth bias in the control group (θ1)
is 0.67 and it is 0.09 in the education group (θ2). The difference between θ1 and
θ2 is significant at the 1% level, which supports that the education treatment
helps to reduce the underestimation of compound interest.
In specification 2, I allow for individual heterogeneity in the parameters
of exponential growth bias and estimate a random coefficients model for
parameters of underestimating compound interest. I use the method of simulated
moments (MSM) to estimate the random coefficients in life cycle models.
For each candidate parameter vector, I simulate the individual parameters
of underestimating compound interest in the sample. I solve the life cycle
model based on these candidate parameters, and then use the resultant optimal
consumption rules to simulate the pension contribution of each individual
in the simulation sample. I use the simulated data to calculate simulated
moments and minimize the distance between simulated moments and empirical
moments in both the survey data and actual pension contribution data. I estimate
five parameters, 	ˆ=(ρˆ,βˆ,μˆ1,μˆ2,σˆ ). ρ and β are parameters for risk and
time preference, similar to those used in specification 1. I assume that the
parameters of underestimating compound interest are lognormally distributed
in both the education group and the control group. μ1 and σ are the mean and
standard deviation of the logarithm of exponential growth bias in the control
group, and μ2 and σ are the mean and standard deviation of the logarithm of
exponential growth bias in the education group. I assume that the intervention
only influences the mean but not the standard deviation of the underlining
distribution due to random assignment. The estimation is based on the same
twenty-five moment conditions used in specification 1.
Column 2 shows the results for specification 2. Panel A reports the estimated
coefficients of the lognormal distribution. The estimated coefficients of relative
risk aversion and discount factor are 1.64 and 0.95, respectively, which are
similar to specification 1. The estimated μ1 and μ2 are −0.04 and −2.04,
respectively. The difference between μ1 and μ2 is significant at the 1% level,
which supports that the education treatment helps to reduce the underestimation
of compound interest. σ is 1.07. In panel B, I generate the distribution of the
coefficients by taking draws from the coefficients in panel A. The mean of
exponential growth bias in the control group is 0.50 and the standard deviation
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the standard deviation is 0.03. These results suggest that while the exponential
growth bias is large in the control group, the education treatment helps to reduce
the underestimation of compound interest. It also implies a significant amount
of heterogeneity of exponential growth bias in the sample.
I use the estimated parameters to conduct counterfactual welfare analysis
under different policies to increase pension contributions. I consider two
counterfactual policies: the subsidy policy and the financial education policy.
The first scenario is the baseline, where all subjects underestimate the benefit of
compound interest and only receive the existing subsidy. This is the case in the
control group and close to the real-life situation without interventions. I simulate
their pension choices based on the parameters estimated from the control group.
In the second scenario, I consider the subsidy policy that increases the existing
subsidy by 100%. I simulate their pension choices based on the parameters
estimated from the control group and the larger subsidy. In the third scenario,
I consider a financial education program about compound interest. I assume
that financial education can reduce the exponential growth bias by the same
amount in the experiment. Thus, I simulate the pension choices based on the
parameters estimated from the education group.
Table 7, panel C, reports the results. In the baseline scenario, the average
simulated pension contribution is 155 RMB. When I increase the existing
subsidy by 100%, the average contribution increases to 158 RMB, which is
about 2%. If I conduct the financial education that has the same effect in the
experiment, the average contribution increases to 177 RMB, which is about
14%. One can see that the financial education policy has a much larger effect
than a 100% increase in existing subsidy. The counterfactual simulation results
imply that financial education about compound interest is more effective than
the subsidy policy in increasing pension contributions.
Based on the counterfactual simulation, I can calculate the lifetime utility
for each individual and analyze the welfare effect. I first calculate the welfare
gain if the understanding of compound interest increases from the level of
the control group to the level of perfect understanding. I find that the lifetime
utility increases by 10.0% if they estimate compound interest correctly. I also
calculate the welfare gain if the understanding of compound interest increases
from the level of the control group to the level of the education group. I find
that the education treatment increases the lifetime utility by 8.6% compared to
the control group.12
6. Conclusion
As rural households in developing countries tend to get old before they get
rich, saving for retirement has become an increasingly important research and
12 Ambuehl, Bernheim, and Lusardi (2014) introduce the concept of financial competence to measure the quality
of decision-making and conduct welfare analysis. They find that an intervention that teaches compound interest
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policy topic. Lack of pension savings can have significant consequences on
the standard of living of the rural elderly. In this paper, I provide working-age
subjects with financial education about compound interest, with the goal of
testing for the role of misunderstanding compound interest in rural pension
savings in China. I find that the education treatment increases contributions
by 49–53 RMB, resulting in an increase of around 37%–40% relative to the
average contribution of 133 RMB in the control group. Both reduced form and
structural estimation support that the intervention improves the understanding
of compound interest.
Evidence on whether financial education can effectively change individual
decisions is mixed in the literature. This paper shows that learning the concept
of compound interest can help to increase pension contributions in rural areas,
and financial education that helps to increase knowledge has a larger effect than
simply providing information. Gaurav, Cole, and Tobacman (2011) and Cai
and Song (2017) find that financial education with simulated experiences has a
positive and significant effect on adoption of weather insurance in developing
countries. These findings suggest that one should first identify the barriers to
individual participation and then deliver specific financial education to remove
these barriers; this seems to work better than general financial education.
This paper has several limitations. First, I do not know whether the
intervention crowds savings in or out in other savings accounts and whether it
changes overall savings, because I do not have data about subjects’ savings
accounts.13 The purpose of the study is to understand why people do not
reallocate their savings to high-return pension plans and how to improve their
allocation of savings, given their misunderstanding of compound interest. I
demonstrate that the intervention changes the allocation of savings in the
pension account and discuss possible mechanisms. The second limitation
is external validity. The results might apply to the setting where people
are well informed about the pension plan and that the time lag between
pledging and cash payment is short. Although the experiment was conducted
in rural China, I believe that the external validity problem might not be
severe for the following reasons: (1) misunderstanding of compound interest is
widespread in the United States and is correlated with poor decision-making
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2007b); (2) a recent study in the United States shows
that mailing printed income projections increases savings in the Voluntary
Retirement Plans (Goda, Manchester, and Sojourner 2014). Compared to Goda,
Manchester, and Sojourner (2014), this paper examines the effects of a more
labor-intensive treatment that includes face-to-face provision of information.
Future research should test a more cost-effective method to explain compound
interest, such as providing education in groups or through computerized
training.
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Avenues for future research include evaluating whether financial education
about compound interest influences households’ behavior regarding other
financial products, such as other long-term borrowing and savings. From a
policy perspective, this paper suggests that policy makers should take into
account people’s biases when designing policies. In particular, policy makers
can provide low-cost financial education to overcome individual biases, and
thus improve individual welfare.
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